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91-594.ZS
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1993-11-06
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS v. S. G. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 91-594. Argued March 3, 1992-Decided June 19, 1992
In a state-court tort action, respondents alleged that one of them had
contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood supplied
by petitioner American National Red Cross. The Red Cross removed
the suit to the Federal District Court, claiming federal jurisdiction
based on, inter alia, the provision in its federal charter authorizing
it ``to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal,
within the jurisdiction of the United States.'' The court rejected
respondents' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that
the charter provision conferred original federal jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals reversed.
Held:The charter's ``sue and be sued'' provision confers original federal
court jurisdiction. Pp.3-16.
(a)A congressional charter's ``sue and be sued'' provision may be
read to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically
mentions the federal courts. The charter must contain an express
authorization, such as ``in all state courts . . . and in any circuit court
of the United States,'' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat.
738, 818, or ```in any court of law or equity, State or Federal,'''
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
455-456, rather than a mere grant of general corporate capacity to
sue, such as ```in courts of record, or any other place whatsoever,'''
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 85-86, or ``in all
courts of law and equity within the United States,'' Bankers Trust
Co. v. Texas and Pacific R. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 304-305. The Red
Cross charter provision has an express authorization and thus should
be read to confer jurisdiction. Pp.3-9.
(b)Respondents' several arguments against this conclusion-that
the well-pleaded complaint rule bars the removal; that language in
congressional charters enacted closely in time to the 1947 amendment
of the Red Cross charter incorporating the provision in dispute show
a coherent drafting pattern that casts doubt on congressional intent
to confer federal jurisdiction over Red Cross cases; and that the 1947
amendment was meant not to confer jurisdiction, but to clarify the
Red Cross' capacity to sue in federal courts where an independent
jurisdictional basis exists-are all unavailing. Pp.9-15.
(c)The holding in this case leaves the jurisdiction of the federal
courts well within Article III's limits. This Court has consistently
held that Article III's ``arising under'' jurisdiction is broad enough to
authorize Congress to confer federal court jurisdiction over actions
involving federally chartered corporations. P.16.
938 F.2d 1494, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and
Kennedy, JJ., joined.